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From Pacifist to Patriot: The Manipulation of Tolstoy’s Legacy in Russian Culture and Society
From the late nineteenth century— Leo Tolstoy’s time, when the seeds of the Revolution
were being sown—to glasnost, the fall of the USSR, and the tumultuous years of transition into a
post-Communist Russian state, the role of Tolstoy has been shaped and reshaped, questioned and
debated. Ultimately, the ideological needs of the state have guided the treatment of Tolstoy and
his works; as these needs have changed, so has the author's role in society. The relevance
of Tolstoy’s writings and his status as an embodiment of "Russianness" persist to this day. In
particular, Anna Karenina reflects an ongoing theme in Russian history whose origins far predate
Tolstoy: the conflict between the forces of nationalism and westernization.
The pre-revolutionary Russia of Tolstoy’s lifetime (1828-1910) provided a hostile
environment for literature—a legacy which would continue, with few exceptions, throughout
most of the Soviet era. In the nineteenth century, openly discussing politics was likely to lead to
confrontation with the state; therefore, literature served as a more subtle means to communicate
political ideas (Parthé 6). Even so, politically-minded writers had to be cautious. Under the rule
of Nicholas I (1825-55), in an effort to protect fundamental values such as loyalty to the tsar
from threats which could undermine the regime, censorship was formally established (Parthé 31).
The system essentially continued until 1905, when the February Revolution ensured that
monitoring literary output was the least of the government’s concerns (Parthé 42). This first
mass outburst of revolution was presaged by a shift in the Russian political atmosphere
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throughout the nineteenth century, marked by significant forces like the Slavophile-Westernizer
debates originating in the 1840s, the abolition of serfdom in 1861, and the industrialization of the
country (Wilson 273).
Some of the responses to a changing Russia surfaced in the areas of religion, politics, and
philosophy. The twentieth-century Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev considered the
nineteenth century to be “especially illustrative of the character of the Russian ideal and the
Russian vocation,” which was particularly divided between the pull of tradition and the pull of
westernization (20-1). Additionally, socialistic thought became more widespread, changing the
landscape of Russian intellectual culture (Berdyaev 116). It was in this fertile atmosphere that
Tolstoy was to work out his own religious and political philosophies. In fact, Berdyaev argues
that the most influential religious minds of the nineteenth century were not theologians, but
authors such as Tolstoy (194-5). The Russian people, many of whom had neglected or rejected
their Christian faith, nonetheless responded to his teachings with a nearly religious fervor (1945).
Though Tolstoy was born into a wealthy, aristocratic family, in his young adulthood he
became interested in questions about the interactions and moral obligations between peasants and
landowners. He soon faced the reality of these musings when, two years into his education at
Kazan University, he dropped out and inherited the family estate, Yasnaya Polyana (Bartlett 812). Tolstoy was deeply inspired by Tsar Alexander II’s March 1856 speech on the necessity of
taking action to end serfdom. He began to work toward freeing his serfs, thus joining “the
distinguished ranks of the gentry whose awakened social conscience caused them to become
‘repentant noblemen’” in the style of Alexander Radishchev, an eighteenth-century writer known
for his exposé of serfdom, A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow (Bartlett 127). In addition,
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Tolstoy planned to start a school for the peasant children of Yasnaya Polyana (Bartlett 144). He
had come to believe, as had many Russian socialists of the late nineteenth century, that peasants
were “bearers of a collectivist and essentially Russian identity” (Lieven 258). For Tolstoy, the
peasant, and not the wealthy landowner, was the real righteous man: connected to nature, God,
and family (Berdyaev 137-9).
Tolstoy’s social and religious views developed more fully during his “spiritual crisis” of
the late 1870s, in which he became “the most devout he had ever been in his life” (Bartlett 252).
He visited the Optina Pustyn monastery, and was attracted to the idea of the “elders” there—
strictly self-disciplined monks who were viewed as spiritual leaders within the monastery and
figures of wisdom and even healing in the broader community (Bartlett 253-4). By 1880,
Tolstoy had begun to write scathing criticisms of the Russian Orthodox Church—including
attacks on fundamental beliefs such as the trinity and the sacraments, and wrote his own
translation of the Gospels, focusing on the moral teachings of Jesus while ignoring supernatural
and miraculous events (Bartlett 285-6). By 1883, Tolstoy was consistently wearing peasant
clothing and trying to disown his aristocratic background, and in April 1891, he began to live a
simple lifestyle, finally giving up all of his property and dividing his estate among his children
and his wife, Sonya (Bartlett 302, 331).
Anna Karenina, published serially from 1873-77, was born out of Tolstoy’s spiritual
crisis and the current social climate in Russia. In contrast to Tolstoy’s great historical novel,
War and Peace, Anna Karenina is set in the Russia in which it was written, a Russia that was
increasingly looking toward modernization and the West (Wilson 268). As in the literature of
Victorian England, the railroad in Russian literature was symbolic of industrialism encroaching
on the purity of nature (Wilson 273). Berdyaev suggests that Tolstoy always preferred “nature”
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to “culture,” and thus “[t]he railroad comes to [Tolstoy] ready-made with foreboding” (147,
Wilson 274). It is significant that the railroad, this symbol of modernization, is an integral part
of the beginning of Anna’s story, and involved in her tragic end.
Anna Karenina also addresses the degradation of morals as Tolstoy saw them—
particularly the weakening state of marriage and family. Tolstoy’s first draft of Anna Karenina
did not include the Levin/Kitty storyline and therefore provided no moral counterpoint to Anna’s
story (Wilson 269). As Tolstoy biographer A.N. Wilson notes, as Tolstoy reworked the novel,
“he was apostasising from his view that the purpose of a novel was to make people laugh and cry
over it,” instead focusing on addressing the social problems of his time and laying out his moral
vision (269, Orwin 169). He does this by essentially inserting himself into the novel in the form
of Konstantin Levin. Though the character is not completely autobiographical, Levin’s life bears
a striking resemblance to Tolstoy’s in many ways— their maids share the same names, their
brothers die similar deaths, and Levin proposes to Kitty in the same manner that Tolstoy
proposed to his wife (Wilson 279). Perhaps most importantly, they both manifest a strong
interest in the nature of the relationship between landowners and peasants and undergo deep
spiritual and existential struggles. In fact, Wilson argues that Tolstoy was simply working out
his own problems through Levin (279-80). Because Levin’s struggle to form a meaningful
identity is an explicit reflection of Tolstoy’s own journey, Anna Karenina is Tolstoy’s most
personal work of fiction and thus provides a pertinent case study for analyzing the government’s
treatment of the author and his works over time.
As a strong critic of the cozy relationship between church and state in tsarist Russia,
Tolstoy distinguished himself as someone who was willing to go to great lengths to “[strive]
after social truth and justice” as he saw it (Berdyaev 137). Tolstoy was thus a threat to an
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establishment seeking through censorship to protect fundamental beliefs and values (e.g.
militarism, patriarchy, and elitism) (Parthé 45). Polish Marxist theorist Rosa Luxemburg’s
summary of Tolstoy’s beliefs clearly demonstrates why Russia’s state apparatus was wary of
Tolstoy’s seemingly revolutionary claims:
The criticism to which Tolstoy has submitted the existing order is radical; it
knows no limits, no retrospective glances, no compromises… The ultimate
destruction of private property and the state, universal obligation to work, full
economic and social equality, a complete abolition of militarism, brotherhood of
nations, universal peace and equality of everything that bears the human image—
this is the ideal which Tolstoy had been tirelessly preaching with the stubbornness
of a great and vehement prophet. (qtd. in Bartlett 345-6)
Tolstoy’s seemingly radical political beliefs had much in common with the socialist undercurrent
of the late nineteenth century which was mobilizing for revolution. In fact, Tolstoy’s The
Kingdom of God is Within You (1893) literally shared the illegal printing press with
revolutionary propaganda (Bartlett 345).
Despite the fact that, in 1897, about three-quarters of the Russian population were
illiterate, Tolstoy became a symbol of national consciousness, amassing thousands of loyal
followers—Tolstoyans—who looked to imitate his moral and ascetic example (Bartlett 424).
Tolstoy’s death in 1910 was a national time of mourning, and, to the great chagrin of the
government, Tolstoy’s funeral was a highly politicized event featuring strikes, marches, and
demonstrations. The state was at a loss; it could not suppress the Russian people’s collective
outpouring of grief (Bartlett 415). In addition, after the upheaval of the 1905 February
Revolution, literary censorship was the last item on the government’s agenda, and it had become
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much easier to access and disseminate the works of Tolstoy and his contemporaries (Parthé 42).
After the 1917 October Revolution, all of Tolstoy’s previously banned works could be published
openly and without censorship (Bartlett 422-3). Aylmer Maude, a contemporary of Tolstoy as
well as his biographer and English translator, along with other observers, believed strongly that
the example of Tolstoy’s life and the availability of his works helped to spark the 1917
revolution (Bartlett 424).
Tolstoy’s ideas spread rapidly across the nation. The Tolstoyans had grown to
encompass five to six thousand Russians, many of them peasants and some of them
professionals. Supporters of the aims of the February Revolution, they sympathized with the
Bolsheviks’ anti-militarism and confiscation of Church and private land. The violence of the
October Revolution and ensuing civil war drew the groups into disagreement, however, and in
1919 the Tolstoyans had to actively resist being drafted into the Red Army despite the fact that
their conscientious objector status had been previously respected in 1917 (Bartlett 424-5).
Changing attitudes toward Tolstoyans were a reflection of the post-Revolution ambivalence to
Tolstoy himself, which would soon bring about a debate about the place of Tolstoy’s legacy in a
new Russian context.
Much discussion of Tolstoy centered around Vladimir Lenin’s published commentary on
the author; specifically, “Leo Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution” (Proletary No.
35, 1908), “L.N. Tolstoy” (Sotsial-Demokrat No. 18, 1910), and “L.N. Tolstoy and The Modern
Labour Movement” (Nash Put’ No. 7, 1910). He also addresses the role of literature more
broadly in “Party Organisation and Party Literature” (Novaya Zhizn, No. 12, 1905). In “Leo
Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution,” Lenin first acknowledges that his goal for the
article, “[t]o identify the great artist [Tolstoy] with the revolution which he has obviously failed
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to understand, and from which he obviously stands aloof, may at first sight seem strange and
artificial” (par. 1). He nonetheless begins to probe Tolstoy’s “glaring contradictions”—he is an
artistic genius, yet he is a “landlord obsessed with Christ”; he is a keen critic of capitalism and
the social order, yet he is a pacifist and a preacher of “one of the most odious things on earth,
namely, religion” (par. 3). Yet Lenin makes allowances for Tolstoy and sees him as a product of
a contradictory time in Russian history, where the post-emancipation peasants were in opposition
to the onslaught of exploitative capitalism, yet at the same time “had a very crude, patriarchal,
semi-religious idea” of what the destruction of that system entailed— hence, why so many
peasants did not participate in the February Revolution (par. 4). Rather, they “wept and prayed,
moralised and dreamed, wrote petitions and sent ‘pleaders’—quite in the vein of Leo Tolstoy”
(par. 5). In essence, Lenin argues that Tolstoy is a mirror of the Revolution in that he mirrors its
weaknesses; he uses this as an opportunity to call for action to avoid the “historical sin of
Tolstoyism” (par. 5, 8).
With all his criticisms, however, Lenin does not ignore Tolstoy’s literary contributions; in
“L.N. Tolstoy,” written to commemorate the author’s death and reinforce his claims in “Leo
Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution,” he praises Tolstoy’s works as “a step forward
in the artistic development of humanity as a whole” (par. 2). One paragraph later, Lenin turns
this praise into politics, referencing the rampant illiteracy of the time and calling for rebellion
against the existing order which keeps Tolstoy’s art from being “made the possession of all”
(par. 3). He exhorts readers to take Tolstoy’s ideas further—that is, to “weld themselves into a
united army of millions of socialist fighters who will overthrow capitalism and create a new
society in which the people will not be doomed to poverty, in which there will be no exploitation
of man by man” (par. 12). Lenin thus establishes his willingness to overlook some of Tolstoy’s
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flaws, as he perceives them, in the service of a socialist revolution—a theme which would
continue throughout Soviet history.
Lenin was not a literary critic, and despite the importance assigned to his comments, they
are not particularly useful when discussing literary criticism of the time. The major Russian
literary movement of the late nineteenth century into the early twentieth century was Symbolism,
which provided a more comprehensive framework by which to assess literature than Lenin’s
commentary. The proponents of the movement responded to the dominant school of realism
through their efforts to transcend the mundane by making art a spiritual experience (Wellek 32).
Symbolism exalts the use of symbols as a method of “[revealing] a higher reality” (Wellek 31).
One member of the early Symbolist movement, Dmitry Merezhovsky (1865-1941), had a fairly
clear evaluation of Tolstoy. His literary philosophy was focused on antithesis—that is, a belief
that “[e]verything has its polar opposite” (Henry 110). In Merezhovsky’s Tolstoy and
Dostoevsky (1901-2), for example, he characterizes Dostoevsky as a “seer of the spirit,” and
Tolstoy as the opposite—a “seer of the flesh” (111). Furthermore, he argues that Tolstoy’s
characters, from peasant to nobleman, all have the same “voice,” whereas Dostoevsky’s
characters are more linguistically varied (113). Merezhovsky’s overly polarized remarks
discredit him to some extent, however, and it is clear that they are borne out of a personal
preference for Dostoevsky over Tolstoy, mostly on the basis of what he sees as the purity of
Dostoevsky’s spiritual beliefs (112).
A second wave of symbolism, which R.H. Henry calls “Russian ‘religious’ Symbolism,
was promoted by Vyacheslav Ivanov (1866-1949), Alexander Blok (1880-1921), and Boris
Bugaev (1880-1934, best known by his pseudonym, Andrey Bely) (Henry 132). Even more so
than Merezhovsky’s variant, these second-wave Symbolists were, as their name suggests,
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“deeply involved, as men, poets, and critics, with religion or mysticism” (Henry 132). In Blok’s
case, this manifested in his quasi-religious belief that “Russia, free of the humanistic and
individualistic traditions of the West, would eventually bring about a new man and a new
society,” which presages the eventual Marxist-Leninist belief in the immanence of societal
transformation (134). Additionally, Bely’s interests in the nature of Russian poetic form would
serve as a precursor to the development of the influential Formalist movement, as we shall see
(Henry 136-7).
The debate about how best to approach literature was significant not only in literary
circles, but in the highest strata of the state apparatus. People in positions of ideological power
were divided in their opinions of Tolstoy’s virtues— they had difficulty reconciling his
inappropriate disdain for the state as a whole with his appropriate hatred of the tsarist regime and
its institutions (Bartlett 434). Marxist literary critic Vladimir Friche (1870-1929), for instance,
criticized his fellow Marxists for projecting heroic qualities upon Tolstoy as an author and
philosopher; he “considered Tolstoy’s mentality to be as religious and authoritarian as that of any
feudal lord, and to be totally alien to the Soviet spirit” (Fodor 67). In 1928, prominent Party
member Mikhail Olminsky went so far as to call War and Peace and Anna Karenina
“counterrevolutionary works” and actually suggested banning them; however, this was not the
view of most Party members (Fodor 68-9). For example, Anatoly Lunacharsky, the People’s
Commissar for Education and cultural minister in the 1920s, was a proponent of publishing
Tolstoy’s “artistic” work, and saw Tolstoy as “a valuable adjunct to the country’s cultural life”
(Fodor 55, 68). The Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) was also pro-Tolstoy
and encouraged proletarians to engage with his work (Fodor 70). Ultimately, however, it was
Lenin’s opinion which held the most sway over the Tolstoy question. Before his death in 1924,
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Lenin had relentlessly pursued the project of publishing Tolstoy’s collected work as “a matter of
state importance” (Bartlett 425).
Throughout the civil war years, the Bolsheviks had prioritized the dissemination of
Russian classic literature, developing a “People’s Library” to get inexpensive or free books into
the hands of citizens (Lovell 27). By the end of the war, the practice was financially
unsustainable, but non-state publishers under Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) were
encouraged to continue publishing classics (Lovell 27). The NEP had a significant impact on
Soviet literature as a whole—Natalia Kornienko refers to the period of 1921 to 1927 as
“formative” in regard to “the very institution of Soviet criticism” (17). A 1925 resolution of the
Central Committee, entitled “On Party Politics in the Area of Belles Lettres” promoted literary
criticism as “one of the main educational institutions at the party’s disposal” (qtd. in Kornienko
21). It became the intention of the Party to direct literary criticism so as to promote the proper
view of a work of literature—in essence, to mediate between the reader and the text (Kornienko
21). The average Soviet reader was not impressed by contemporary literature, however, and the
classics continued to be popular. Contributing to this lack of interest was the small but
significant group of critics associated with the far-left journals Lef (1923-25) and Noviy Lef
(1927-28), which included Vladimir Mayakovsky and Viktor Shklovsky (30). These critics took
a very particular view of the purposes of literature: that it should “take upon itself the function of
preparing man for work, practice, and invention—the revolutionary transformation of everyday
life.” The Russian classics did not satisfy these purposes; thus, they were of little merit. Readers
and writers, however, were not interested in reading and publishing the kind of work the Lef
critics promoted (33).
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Perhaps the most prominent school of literary thought in 1920s Russia was Formalism;
notable Formalists included Shklovsky, Boris Eikhenbaum, and Yuri Tynianov (Emerson 64,
67). Caryl Emerson summarizes the tenets of Formalism:
Formalism offered a scientific (or at least a systematic) methodology to replace
the mysticism of fin-de-siècle thought. It argued for the cognitive structuredness
of art against intuitivist and subjectivist theories. With its newly precise
terminology, it promised to restore autonomy to the literary study of single works
and of whole traditions… Unlike the two powerful, eclectic, visionary movements
that flanked them (symbolist criticism before and socialist realism after), the
formalists were militantly secular, passionate about the objective reality of the
palpable world, and keen on literary “specificity” as well as empirical analysis.
(65)
The Formalists focused on the autonomy of words and literary works—external influences were
largely cast aside in favor of examining texts with an eye for phonics, structure, and rhythm,
especially in regard to poetry. For Formalists, an author is an “operator of the device” (Emerson
68, 71). Shklovsky in particular believed that art should “make the familiar unfamiliar,” causing
us to notice the mundane in a new way; this was a notable reversal of the traditional view.
Shklovsky thought Tolstoy was a good example of this defamiliarization (ostranenie) due to his
“characteristic manner of debunking cherished romantic illusions” (Henry 166-7). This is
certainly the case in works such as Anna Karenina, in which the glamorous life of the elite is
revealed to be empty and tragic, whereas the simple life of the peasants is extolled as virtuous
and fulfilling. As the state took control of literature, Formalism, and its refusal to apply MarxistLeninst philosophy to the interpretation of literature, was met with hostility.
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Official state policy on Tolstoy was not settled until 1928, when the occasion of
Tolstoy’s Jubilee made the issue a pressing one (Fodor 71; Bartlett 438). The Tolstoy Jubilee
was meant to be a celebration of the hundred-year anniversary of Tolstoy’s birth, and it would be
the first Soviet event to commemorate a pre-revolutionary writer (Bartlett 438). In 1926,
Tolstoy’s daughter Alexandra secured an audience with Stalin, who had come to power after
Lenin’s death in 1924, to request one million rubles to renovate Yasnaya Polyana and the
Tolstoy Museum in Moscow, but was rejected. She quickly learned that Stalin was only
interested in the Jubilee insofar as it was “a felicitous opportunity for international propaganda”
(Bartlett 436). Before this could occur, however, the state had to decide on its official position
toward Tolstoy. This came in 1928 with a declaration that Tolstoy the writer would be separated
from Tolstoyanism the movement (Bartlett 435). The anonymous Pravda article, which was
very likely written or at least overseen by Stalin, proclaimed “[w]e do not refuse, and we do not
think of refusing, Tolstoy’s artistic heritage… One has to take Tolstoy as he is…with all his
merits and faults. Tolstoy deserves this” (qtd. in Fodor 71). With this established, the Jubilee
proceedings could be used as “an occasion to educate Soviet citizens on how to approach
Tolstoy,” who was the most popular author in Russia at the time (Bartlett 438).
One vital element of the Jubilee celebration was the planned release of the Jubilee Edition
of Tolstoy’s Complete Collected Works—a project that Lenin did not live to see completed.
Editing and compiling Tolstoy’s works was a huge state effort, and financial issues and
bumbling bureaucracy prevented the Complete Collected Works from being published in time for
the celebration (Bartlett 437-8). One obstacle was that Lenin had wanted the Complete Collected
Works published in its entirety without censorship; however, upon further inspection of his more
obscure writings, the editors learned that Tolstoy was a critic of the revolutionary movement in
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his later years of staunch pacifism (441). This uncomfortable discovery added to the preexisting
publishing difficulties. Volumes were published out of order and sporadically, then stopped
from 1939 to 1949 (442). Publication resumed after Stalin’s death in 1953 and the collection
was finally completed in 1958, thirty years after the Jubilee. Tolstoy’s religious works were
thereafter banned from future publication (443). By the early 1930s, the state had exclusive
rights to publishing—over fifty classic authors such as Tolstoy had been “nationalized,” thus
giving the state the right to distribute or censor them as it saw fit (Lovell 36, 38; Bartlett 432).
RAPP had pushed out all other competing literary movements; it became the only state-approved
body dealing in literature (Dobrenko 45). RAPP, though it was disbanded in 1932 and replaced
with the All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers, was the birthplace of the basic tenets of Soviet
criticism, which persisted throughout the existence of the Soviet Union (Dobrenko 49).
It was at the 1934 All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers in which Maxim Gorky (18681936) first described the tenets of what was later called “Socialist realism”:
To invent means to extract from the totality of real existence its basic idea and to
embody this in an image—thus we obtain realism. But if to the idea extracted
from the real we add the desirable and the potential and if the image is thereby
supplemented, we obtain that romanticism which lies at the basis of myth and
which is very useful in that it facilitates the arousing of a revolutionary attitude
towards reality. (qtd. in Henry 188)
Socialist realism did not simply arise out of nothing—the realist aspect was inspired by “the
‘great tradition’ of Russian realism” in which Tolstoy was a major player. Soviet realism was
thus seen as a natural extension of the literary traditions which Tolstoy began (Henry 188). The
Socialist aspect, of course, involves the addition of a certain romantic conception of Socialist
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ideas coming to fruition in a work. Socialist realism, by which the contemporary Soviet literary
scene was to be defined, involved a positivizing of Soviet experience. As Henry notes, a work of
Socialist realism “is a simple world... of black and white” in which “intervening shades of gray
are not only unaesthetic but they are politically suspect” (188). It would be anachronistic to
judge Tolstoy’s work on the basis of the tenets of Socialist realism, but his contributions to
realism could be used to cast him as a sort of distant patriarch of the state-sanctioned literary
movement.
The development of official policies on literature was representative of larger changes
taking place within the Soviet Union under Stalin. Educational policy had shifted from a prerevolutionary focus on “classical literary culture and Orthodox doctrine” to a more technical
curriculum that was appropriate for modernization (Lapidus 82). The Commissariat of
Enlightenment sought to find a balance between the lofty intellectual pursuits of the old regime
and an “excessive vocationalism and narrow specialization” which could be limiting in its scope
(82-3). This led to the uncomfortable realization that students were “expected to foster cultural
secularism and a critical scientific outlook…while simultaneously cultivating the development of
a proper Communist world view” which was still in its formative stages (84-5). These goals
changed during what Gail Warshofsky Lapidus sees as the second period of development in the
educational system of the USSR from 1928 to 1931 (89). The Five-Year Plan necessitated that
higher education be reorganized to quickly train students for technical and vocational skills.
These priorities reverberated throughout the educational system—even elementary-aged students
were exposed “to a campaign style in which productive labor replaced formal learning” (92-3).
Naturally, traditional book-learning fell to the wayside in order to make way for the current
needs of the state, and university faculty suspected to have “intelligentsia and bourgeois
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origins”—ties to traditional education—were purged from their positions (91). These purges and
the difficulty of creating a completely new educational system within a short period of time led
to another shift in policy after 1931 (99-102). It returned much of the “formal and academic
content” to schools and transferred technical training to outside programs which were better
prepared to train students in vocational skills. General schools, then, became ideological, rather
than technical, training grounds (102-3).
The impetus for this “great retreat,” a term coined by Russian sociologist Nikolai
Timashev, was the realization that the Russian Revolution was not, as the Bolsheviks had
originally hoped, going to lead to a global revolutionary movement that would eliminate the need
for nation-states and therefore nationalism (Volkov 213; Fodor 136). By the late 1920s, under
the leadership of Stalin, it was becoming clear that nationalism would not disappear; rather,
“allegiance to Russia alone had become quite compatible with the official ideology” (Fodor 136).
A growing sense of Russian nationalism and traditionalism was nurtured in schools, where
“traditional Russian heroes—even some of the Tsars—returned to relative favor; in literature and
art the Russian realists of the nineteenth century were extolled” (Hough 242). The Great Retreat
was a reaction to the largely failed attempts of Stalin, through the First Five-Year Plan, to rapidly
change cultural, educational, and social attitudes (Hough 244). Collectivization and
industrialization could be forced; institutions and beliefs, less so.
The Great Break gave Party leadership permission to cultivate kul’turnost’, or
“culturedness”—in part, “to assimilate many of the values of the old intelligentsia” (Hough 242).
The Great Retreat thus began to manifest itself in the cultural sphere in addition to the
educational sphere, paving the way for the creation of a new kind of Soviet citizen. The notion
of kul’turnost’, in part, emerged in response to the migration of peasants to the cities as the
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country industrialized. This migration led to crowded and harsh living conditions, as well as a
feeling of displacement among the peasants, who were unaccustomed to urban life. A wave of
social ills such as vulgarity in speech, alcoholism, crime, and poor hygiene overwhelmed the
cities (Volkov 214). These changes were considered destabilizing to the regime and were thus
denounced and heavily punished; nevertheless, nonviolent means were also used to discourage
unruly behavior (Volkov 215). Kul’turnost’ policies served to civilize the people—that is, to
help them to conform to positive social norms—and “to justify inequalities by integrating the
lower strata into a system of quasielitist consumption values” (Volkov 216). Accordingly,
kul’turnost’ touched on many aspects of life, including fashion and interior decorating, but
policies towards language and literature are especially relevant here (Volkov 223).
Vadim Volkov explains the implications of kul’turnost’ in the spheres of literacy and
education:
The culture of speech derived from good literature; and reading was also directly
connected with the acquisition of culturedness. Initially, the word ‘literate’ was a
synonym of ‘cultured’, but as more people read more books,
‘educatedness’…superseded literacy in designating the main feature of the
cultured individual. (223)
The Soviet people were encouraged to engage in intellectual and cultural pursuits in the vein of
the old condemned lifestyle of the bourgeoisie, by attending movies, performances, and other
artistic events, in addition to reading widely from permissible texts (Volkov 225). Because
literacy rates had increased so rapidly, Soviet—and in particular, Russian—citizens “could
absorb the rich traditions of pre-revolutionary literature, thereby acquiring access to a common
Russian identity in a way denied to their ancestors” (Lieven 267). This sense of unity was
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essential to a strong state and sense of nationalism, which would sustain the Soviet Union
throughout WWII.
War provided an opportunity for the Soviet Union to fully embrace Tolstoy as a national
symbol. Alexander Fodor considers Leo Tolstoy (1939), a study by various authors which was
published in two issues of the journal Literaturnoe nasledstvo, as the “first major Soviet
contribution to research on Tolstoy,” which coincided with the beginning of WWII (Fodor 84).
Unlike the uncertainty about Tolstoy’s acceptability in the late 1920s, the editors of the journal
fully acknowledge in their introduction that Tolstoy was “an unassailable giant of Russian and
world literature” (Fodor 85). This was the official state position going into the war, with a
particular emphasis on Tolstoy’s patriotism as a means of boosting national spirit, despite the
fact that he “could not be associated ideologically with the existing system of government”
(Fodor 87-8). Because much of Tolstoy’s nonfiction had already been made unavailable to the
general public, it was not difficult to turn the public’s attention to Tolstoy’s patriotism as
reflected in his participation in the Crimean War and through War and Peace, his epic novel of
Russia in the era of the Napoleonic Wars (Fodor 88).
Post-revolution criticism was aimed heavily at War and Peace, with its “glowing
descriptions of the class enemies of the new order” who united with the lower classes to defend
the nation and its tsarist government, a concept utterly ridiculous to the Bolsheviks (Fodor 135).
However, by the 1940s, the cause of national unity and the importance of Tolstoy as a national
figure were significant enough to overlook this, and during the war War and Peace became
almost a sacred text. Alexander Fodor notes that there were cases in which Red Army soldiers
had been killed and found with Tolstoy’s works on their person (91). Tolstoy’s writings were
easily accessible; when Germany invaded the USSR in 1941, the state published massive reprints
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of parts of Tolstoy’s works in which Russians were fighting against their enemies—War and
Peace was particularly popular (Fodor 90). In Leningrad, which was under siege on the
anniversary of the October Revolution in 1941, Tolstoy’s stories about the defense of Sevastopol
were played over loudspeakers (Bartlett 444). It was in this period that Tolstoy became the most
published author in Russia, but he transcended this simple statistic when “his name began to be
used with the epithet ‘the great’ (velikii), which had been reserved for Stalin for some time”
(Fodor 90). By being so closely associated with the Russian victory in the war, Tolstoy became
the embodiment of Russian power and influence (Fodor 146).
By the end of WWII, any pre-Soviet memories of Tolstoy’s pacifism and resistance to the
state had been practically extinguished, as Bartlett notes:
Tolstoy was firmly entrenched in the Soviet imagination as a symbol of Russia,
and as her most ardent patriot. Generations of Russian schoolchildren now grew
up with the officially approved novels and stories that had become a fixture on the
national curriculum, completely unaware of Tolstoy’s enormous legacy of
religious and political writings. (444)
Critical opinion on Tolstoy in Russia, as a reflection of increasing nationalism brought about by
the war, generally began to regard him as not just the greatest Russian writer, but the greatest
writer in the world. This inflated view of Tolstoy led to unsupported claims such as the assertion
that Tolstoy was the inspiration for the greatest of Western writers (Fodor 91-2). In the
developing contest between the Soviet Union and the West, Tolstoy was a reminder of the
greatness—and even the superiority—of the Russian people.
Tolstoy’s importance to the Russian canon made him a fixture in Soviet school
curriculums from the Stalin era until the fall of the Soviet Union. A culture of strict literary
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controls had developed under Stalin, and many factors could lead a writer or a text to be
considered “politically marked,” as Kathleen Parthé notes:
It could be any number of things, some intrinsic (genre, theme, character, setting,
narrator, ethos, style, use of metaphor and influence, the work in its entirety, or
even a very brief passage from it), others extrinsic (the writer’s background,
including their ethnic identity, friendships, oppositional behavior outside of
literature, the ideological profile of the literary movement with which the work
was identified, events within the country or elsewhere that coincided with its
appearance). (xii)
There was no single process for determining which works and authors were and were not
acceptable—subjectivity reigned (Parthé xii). Because of his status of veneration in the Soviet
Union, Tolstoy was largely exempt from these considerations—with the obvious exceptions of
his religious and philosophical writings, which were politically dangerous, unavailable, and thus
irrelevant (Fodor 102).
Soviet students were exposed to as much Tolstoy as the state deemed appropriate, and
were instructed in the art of Soviet literary analysis so that they might see the forces at work
within Tolstoy’s fiction. These methods of analysis had their basis in the Marxist criticism of the
1920s. The basic Marxist assumptions were that “human behavior… is socially determined,
class conscious, material, and dialectical” (Emerson 77). Reality is concrete, knowable, and
objective, and “[a]ll change is the result of conflict between opposing tendencies. Consciously
or not, authors are a product of this struggle, as are their fictional heroes” (Emerson 77-8).
Therefore, a good Soviet student was to focus on unpacking literary works with this set of beliefs
in mind; the main goal is “unearth[ing] the ideological content” of a literary work, at which point
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“his task is finished, and it is absolute” (Kramer 372). Karl Kramer notes that artistic and
political value were bound up in each other to the extent that good art was inextricably linked to
correct ideology, and vice versa (374). Thus, the basic principles of Soviet literary criticism
were political.
A few specific criteria, most with overlapping qualities, were used to various degrees to
analyze a work of literature: klassovost’, ideinost’, narodnost’, and partiinost’. Klassovost’,
rougly meaning “class character,” has to do with the writer’s “express[ion] of class
consciousness” (Shneidman, “Russia” 627). This method of analysis is particularly difficult to
determine when discussing pre-revolutionary writers who had no conception of the Marxist class
system. This criterion became too nebulous and difficult to apply to the Russian classics, and
had fallen into disuse by the early 1970s (628). A similar issue arose with ideinost’, or “moral
substance” (627). The term was ill-defined; Shneidman characterizes it as “adopt[ing] the
positions of the party by subscribing to its ideology,” which once again could not be applied to
pre-revolutionary works in which Soviet ideology did not yet exist (629). The term thus had to
be modified in these instances by referring to “a moral quality connected with the writer’s
character and his personal philosophy of life, which expresses itself in his attitude toward the
weak, humiliated, and downtrodden, and manifests itself in the positive deeds of the heroes in his
works” (630).
Narodnost’, a term which first appeared in the early nineteenth century, refers to a
faithful representation of “national spirit” (Shneidman 627, 630). Because Russian classics do
not predate the notion, it can be most easily applied:
[Narodnost’] limits the need to tamper with the original texts. It remains only to
put them in proper perspective by emphasizing what is important and overlooking
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the rest… [it] makes it possible to retain the Russian classical heritage in the
Soviet school curricula, and to emphasize the connection between socialist culture
and the best that was written before the revolution. (632-3)
Despite the more natural relations between narodnost’ and classic literature, Shneidman, writing
in 1972, suggests partiinost’ is the most significant literary consideration (633). There is no one
exact definition of partiinost’; however, it generally translates to “partyness, party principles and
spirit”—in essence, toeing the party line in literature and using literature to defend and promote
current political ideology (627, 635-6). After Stalin’s death, and its resulting slight increase in
tolerance for dissent, some Soviet scholars opposed the view that authors who were not Party
members had to write “party literature.” In Lenin’s manifesto, “Party Organization and Party
Literature,” they claimed, it was Lenin’s intention for partiinost’ to apply only to the writings of
Party members, not all citizens (634-5). Considering the importance of partiinost’ in the postStalin era, however, it is clear that the Stalin-era interpretation of partiinost’ persisted. Though
methods of Soviet literary analysis are often vague and overlapping, Kramer does not see the
Soviet methods of interpretation as inherently flawed; some interpretations are certainly
legitimate, considering the fact that Marxist criticism is still relevant today. His problem is that
Soviet criticism sees all other interpretations, and even discussions of textual and authorial
context, as irrelevant (373; Shneidman, “Russia” 636). In a system where the Party dictates and
dominates all aspects of cultural life, however, such an attitude is to be expected.
In addition to the anachronism of seeking Soviet ideals in pre-revolutionary works, there
is a problematic subjectivity inherent in judging a work by purely political standards, which is
perhaps why Soviet literary explorations of Tolstoy are so vague and stilted. Lenin’s writings on
Tolstoy were held up as authoritative commentaries, but as Gleb Struve notes, the articles were
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not intended to be used in such a way and are hardly specific enough to constitute guides for
interpreting Tolstoy’s works:
Lenin’s articles are duly quoted in nearly everything that is written about Tolstoy,
but often these quotations are in the nature of perfunctory lip-service, or perhaps
one should say rather that Lenin’s famous formulas have become part and parcel
of the incantatory magic of Soviet critical and scholarly shamans… (177, 184)
With little substantial help from Lenin, then, teaching Tolstoy came down to a list of Partyapproved discussion topics. N.N. Shneidman explores this further in his 1973 article, “Soviet
Approaches to the Teaching of Literature: A Case Study: L. Tolstoy in Soviet Education,” in
which he notes that the Soviet program for teaching Anna Karenina in universities places little
focus on the individual characters (343). Instead, educators are encouraged to focus more on
societal issues, for instance:
the meaning of [Anna’s] conflict with society. The critical depiction in the novel
of the different strata of nobility and bureaucracy… The reflection in the novel of
the social and public changes in the post-reform period. The consciousness of the
injustice of the landowner-bourgeois order and the search for reconciliation
between the interests of landowners and peasants. (Shneidman 343).
These discussion topics are far from illegitimate. Aside from the more veiled critique of
embracing westernization at the expense of maintaining tradition, as we will discuss, there are
segments of overt political discussions throughout the novel. Levin’s brother, Nikolai, is the
source of much of this commentary. In our first encounter with him, he explains his reasoning
for organizing a manufacturing association “in which all production and profit and, above all, the
tools of production, will be common property”:
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You know that capital oppresses the worker… however much they work, they can
never get out of their brutish situation. All the profits earned by their work, with
which they might improve their situation, give themselves some leisure and,
consequently, education, all surplus earnings are taken from them by the
capitalists… And this order must be changed. (Tolstoy 88)
This sentiment is perfectly compatible with Soviet ideology, but there are caveats. It is
important to note that Nikolai is a pitiable character, with a “sickly, consumptive face,” and
Levin can hardly listen to him speak, recognizing that his brother’s interest in the metal-working
association “was only an anchor saving him from despising himself” (Tolstoy 88). A simple
focus on the above excerpt could give the impression that Nikolai is offering a totally positive
statement, but context suggests that he is not a model of the ideal proto-Soviet citizen but is
instead pathetic and miserable, using his ideology as a crutch.
What to make, then, of Levin, who is the closest analogue to Tolstoy in the novel? Like
Tolstoy, Levin has ideas regarding the treatment of peasants that seem radical to his peers, and,
according to his brother Nikolai, these ideas are essentially communistic. Levin denies this, but
at the same time realizes that “in the depths of his soul he was afraid it was true—true that he
wanted to balance between communism and the established forms and that this was hardly
possible” (Tolstoy 350). Much of Levin’s story revolves around his search for meaning. In a
Soviet novel, his story might end with a wholehearted embrace of communist ideology, leaving
behind the vacillation between the old ways and unconventional thinking. In fact, the conclusion
of Levin’s story is completely antithetical to Soviet thinking. He realizes through the lifealtering death of his brother and the birth of his first child that life cannot be fully explained by
science and reason, and that most Russians do not subscribe to this viewpoint:
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[H]e had been mistaken in supposing, from memories of his youthful university
circle, that religion had outlived its day and no longer existed. All the good
people close to him were believers. The old prince, and Lvov, who he had come
to love so much, and Sergei Ivanovich, and all the women were believers, and his
wife believed as she had believed in early childhood, and ninety-nine hundredths
of all the Russian people, that people whose life inspired the greatest respect in
him, were believers. (Tolstoy 786-7)
By the end of the novel, Levin embraces God as revealed in the Christian faith and vows to live
for the good (Tolstoy 816-7).
Levin’s transformation is spiritual, not ideological or totally rational—it is completely at
odds with Soviet state-sponsored atheism. Yet the strongly-ingrained cultural and educational
phenomenon of Tolstoy during the Soviet period persisted in the face of these contradictions.
Soviet literary criticism and pedagogy masterfully utilized selective attention in order “to use
Tolstoy’s criticism of the bourgois [sic] society for the purpose of educating Soviet young people
in the necessary spirit” while glossing over potentially uncomfortable elements of his work
which are in stark contrast to Soviet ideology (Shneidman, “Soviet Approaches” 345). Though
Tolstoy’s religious writings were unavailable to Soviet citizens, Levin’s spiritual journey is an
essential part of Anna Karenina and offers some insight into Tolstoy’s views. Parthé makes an
important observation on this point: “[t]here is no way of knowing, let alone calculating, the
power of individual readers to have their own powerful encounters with the classic texts, either
during their school years or afterward” (185). Tolstoy’s works had the capacity to resonate with
readers outside of the classroom setting, in ways that were perhaps contrary to the goals of
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Soviet literary pedagogy, and this cannot be discounted when considering the relationship of
Tolstoy to the Soviet people.
This special relationship was rejuvenated in the late 1980s as a result of Mikhail
Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost’—openness in the public sphere. Restrictions on literature were
loosened, and Soviet citizens were finally able to access and study Tolstoy’s religious and
philosophical writings, providing further context for his work (Bartlett 451). A now fully-literate
public was encouraged to read quality literature, and books had become a symbol of a cultured
home—the average household in the late 1980s contained five hundred books (Lovell 67, 72).
Tolstoy remained popular; after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tolstoy-inspired
religious groups sprung up, and efforts were made to update Tolstoy’s Complete Collected
Works now that information was readily available and the political situation was more conducive
to such a venture (Bartlett 452).
Increased freedom of information did not lead to a complete turn from traditional Soviet
literary criticism, however—instead, there was a call to return to the purer days of criticism, to
look to Lenin’s example rather than Stalin’s. Those in favor of Gorbachev’s reforms tended to
believe that Soviet socialism could be reformed “from above,” as Gorbachev was attempting to
do, and sought to strip socialism of all the baggage it had accumulated since Lenin’s time
(Menzel and Dubin 257). At the same time, more “fundamentalist” critics like Aleksandr Kazin
rejected liberalization in the literary realm. They reacted against the influx of new literary
movements such postmodernism, declaring them too Western and unappealing to the majority of
Russian people. Rather, Kazin stressed the importance of retaining Russian values, including
“collectivism, readiness for self-denial and self-sacrifice, [and] religious sentiment…discovered
in the ancient culture of monasticism and iconography, the teachings of Tolstoy, [and] the
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literature of socialist realism” (Menzel and Dubin 265). This debate between tradition and
westernization would come to a head after the fall of Communism, as Russia struggled to define
itself as an independent nation with a new place in the world.
The transition out of seventy years of Communist rule necessitated huge shifts in
culture, economics, and political institutions. Navigating these changes, including an economic
crisis in the early 1990s, left most Russians with little opportunity for leisure, including
literature. Those who continued to read were inundated, thanks to capitalism, with more options
than ever before, which turned some remaining readers to mass literature rather than the standard
pre-revolutionary and Soviet classics (Menzel 43). The optimism of the intelligentsia who
believed that new intellectual freedoms would bring about a literary revolution was soon dashed,
which Menzel explains:
All the great hopes of the Russian intelligentsia that after the fall of censorship
and political control the masses would joyfully turn to the hitherto suppressed
legacy of Great Russian Literature, from Nabokov and Solzhenitsyn, as their
preferred reading matter, had by 1991 turned out to be an illusion… The Great
Writer had been the highest authority in Russian culture ever since the early
nineteenth century for both the government and the people, whether in official or
unofficial culture, and had helped to maintain a notion of literature as an
institution of enlightenment and moral education, as the conscience of the nation.
By the end of the 1990s, this key figure in literary life had been replaced by the
publisher—the PR face of literature—in a radically more commercial
environment. (39)
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Menzel posits four changes in Russian society which may explain the turn away from literature:
a decline in the membership of the intelligentsia, the advent of capitalism and thus
commercialization, the advent of new media, and a lack of literary control and promotion from
the state, which had more important matters to attend to and no longer had an ideological agenda
to promulgate (39). Literature largely lost its role in the political sphere (Parthé 23).
The upheaval caused by the end of communism and the democratizing reforms of the
1990s stirred up a new wave of anti-West sentiment. The Russian political scene saw prodemocratic liberals and conservative nationalist forces vying for control of the newly-established
government (Marsh 491). Glasnost’ had opened up new access to the West, and the fall of the
Soviet Union had enabled the transfer of ideas and culture from the West to Russia, which, on
the whole, imbibed it eagerly. Disillusionment took hold in the mid to late 1990s, however,
when the results of the Western-backed reforms of the Yeltsin era either did not meet
expectations or turned out to be ruinous (Marsh 490).
This disenchantment with the West fostered a growing sense of Russian nationalism and
an understanding of Russia as inherently distinct from the West; these attitudes were soon
reflected in the educational system (Lisovskaya and Karpov 522). In a study of Russian
textbooks from the fall of the Soviet Union to the end of the 1990s, Elena Lisovskaya and
Vyacheslav Karpov found that, “[t]o a great extent, the symbols of national and cultural identity
have replaced the symbols of communist ideology” (533). Discussions of literature were
particularly affected; the “Russianness” of works and the patriotism of Russian writers were
emphasized (533). Nationalism and its correlation with anti-Western sentiment were more
prominent than in the Soviet era (534). Religion was characterized more positively than in the
past, and textbooks highlighted the religious views of authors and incorporated discussions of
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religious themes in literature (534). Lisovskaya and Karpov also found evidence of an influx of
Western theories of literary analysis, with emphases on individualism and personal liberty, which
would have been unheard of in communist-era textbooks (538). How did Russian governmentpublished textbooks reconcile this westernization of education with intensely nationalistic
themes? According to Lisovskaya and Karpov, this cognitive dissonance was not a problem for
most Russians, who were already confronting dichotomies in the political sphere. Pro-market
and pro-West forces clashed throughout the 1990s with anti-West communist and nationalist
groups (540-2). However disparate these ideas seem to be, the combination provided the
necessary balance that Russia needed to survive its first post-Soviet decade (542).
Finding Russia’s niche between intense nationalism and complete westernization has
been a defining theme of the Putin era from 2000 to the present day. Russia must be westernized
enough to survive in a global economy, but Putin has made it clear that Russia is a distinct entity
that is not always willing to play by the rules of the West (Aron, par. 2-3). Nationalistic
sentiment has not gone away; rather, it has been actively promoted by the state in recent years
(Marsh 110). Putin has fostered close ties between the government and the Russian Orthodox
Church, using religion as a nationalist symbol and a connection to the pre-revolutionary past
(Marsh 111). This view of the continuity of Russian culture plays into the arguments of
traditionalists, who “insist that the gulf separating Russia from the West is enormous and
therefore favor [a path] that would affirm Russia’s distinctive traditions.” Conversely, Russian
liberals favor greater engagement with and adaptation to the Western world (Sakwa 38). This
tension between tradition and adaptation contributes to the cultural and political “dualism
[which] characterizes most democratic institutions and processes in Russia” (Sakwa 39).
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An examination of Anna Karenina reveals that Tolstoy’s work has not lost its relevance
in the context of Russia today. The novel offers significant parallels between Tolstoy’s Russia
and today’s Russia—parallels which touch on questions that have plagued Russia for years. As
Andrew Kaufman notes, “[during the writing of Anna Karenina,] Russia was making a transition
to a capitalist economy, which resulted in the emergence of a new professional class—one that
introduced Western materialism and individualism into a society formerly nourished, Tolstoy
believed, on the ideals of community and compassion” (148). Both this transition and the
Russian transition from communism to capitalism involve grappling with Western culture and
deciding how, and to what extent, to adapt it to their lives (Kaufman 149). The two storylines of
Anna and Levin provide a clear choice between two paths—the sensual, vacuous, modern
“European” life of Anna and her set, which ends in tragedy, and Levin’s rejection of such a
lifestyle and his ultimately fulfilling embrace of tradition, family, and “Russianness.”
These two worlds come into stark contrast most notably when Dolly visits Vronsky and
Anna and is jarred and unsettled by their estate:
[It] gave her an impression of opulence and display and that new European luxury
she had only read about in English novels but had never seen in Russia, let alone
in the country. Everything was new, from the new French wallpaper to the carpet
that covered the entire floor… The marble washstand, the dressing table, the
couch, the tables, the bronze clock on the mantelpiece, the curtains on the
windows and doors—it was all expensive and new. (Tolstoy 616)
But it is the nursery made for Anna and Vronsky’s daughter that most disturbs Dolly. The
daughter is tended to in part by an English governess, and the room is filled with furniture and
supplies “all of English make, of good quality, and obviously very expensive” (Tolstoy 618).
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Yet the luxury of the room cannot mask the coldness of Anna’s regard for her daughter—Dolly
quickly understands that Anna’s visits to the nursery are rare when she observes the relationship
between Anna, the governess, and the nurse, and discovers that Anna knows little about her own
child (Tolstoy 619).
Dolly feels not only awkward and out of place at Anna and Vronsky’s home, but soon
turns defensive at the dinner table when Anna and Vronsky’s friends begin to discuss Levin’s
eccentricities—notably, his aversion to using machines in farming. Vronsky, who admits to
having never met Levin, suggests that Levin “has probably never seen the machines he
denounces. And if he has seen and tried one, it was not of foreign make but some Russian
version” (Tolstoy 632). These derogatory comments associate Levin’s backwardness with his
Russianness and lead Sviyazhsky, another dinner guest, to propose that Levin’s ways suggest
that he is “un petit peu toqué [a bit cracked]” (Tolstoy 632). Dolly jumps to Levin’s defense,
but is ultimately left with an “unpleasant impression” of the “impersonal and strained character”
of the evening, and resolves not to stay for two days but to instead leave the following day
(Tolstoy 634-5).
Dolly’s estrangement is further exacerbated by her conversation with Anna later that
night, in which she reveals to Dolly that she uses contraceptives. Dolly is appalled, believing—
as Tolstoy did—that such methods of preventing pregnancy are immoral and destructive to
families (Bartlett 245, Tolstoy 637). As Andrew Kaufman notes, Tolstoy viewed the weakening
of family ties as “both a catastrophe in its own right and as the embodiment of the larger
processes of disintegration he saw all around him” (149). Anna’s use of birth control is
symptomatic of a larger problem: the intrusion of a foreign—that is, Western—culture, which
values individual gratification over moral living and devotion to others (Orwin 181). Levin’s
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storyline is necessary to counteract Anna’s and to provide an example of a life devoted to family,
which he sees as the ultimate expression of love—not love as a “gratification of personal desire,”
but a selfless, spiritual love, “[a] devotion to a community, a tradition, a set of ideals” (Kaufman
155, Orwin 179).
It is significant that it is a peasant who provides this turning point for Levin, opening his
mind to the idea of living for God and for others rather than for himself:
“…people are different. One man just lives for his own needs…just stuffs his
belly, but Fokanych [another peasant]—he’s an upright old man. He lives for the
soul. He remembers God.”
“How’s that? Remembers God? Lives for the soul?” Levin almost shouted.
“Everybody knows how—by the truth, by God’s way”…
A new, joyful feeling came over [Levin]. At the muzhik’s words about Fokanych
living for the soul, by the truth, by God’s way, it was as if a host of vague but
important thoughts burst from some locked-up place and, all rushing towards the
same goal, whirled through his head, blinding him with their light. (Tolstoy 794)
Donna Tussing Orwin attaches great significance to the peasantry in Anna Karenina as a
representation of moral purity. Their work is “a manifestation of their essence, of the God in
their souls” (145, 148). It is no wonder, then, that Levin, in his quest for meaning, is drawn to
the peasantry. By uniting himself with the peasants through labor, he experiences a kind of
moral cleansing, which he first discovered when he once “[got] angry with the steward” and used
mowing as “his remedy for calming down” (Tolstoy 247). This purifying ritual is significant
enough to Levin to justify any embarrassment or inconvenience it may cause, even during his
brother’s visit:
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But having walked through the meadow, recalling his impressions of mowing, he
was now almost decided that he would mow. And after the vexing conversation
with his brother, he again recalled this intention.
“I need physical movement, otherwise my character definitely deteriorates,” he
thought, and he decided to mow no matter how awkward it was in front of his
brother and the peasants. (Tolstoy 248).
Levin’s involvement with the peasants is decidedly real, spiritual, and communal—the
embodiment of Russianness. This path is life-giving: literally, in the birth of Levin and Kitty’s
first child, and figuratively in Levin’s new understanding of a simple life lived for God and
others. In contrast, Anna’s pursuit of decadence and individual pleasure at the expense of her
family and friends leads to her death and the suffering of those close to her. Tolstoy offers more
than just moral advice—he offers a choice between life and death.
How, then, in Putin’s Russia, is Tolstoy’s moral message received? It is first worth
considering whether it is received at all. Reading is less popular than in the past—the advent of
digital media has provided Russians with alternative outlets for leisure time. Libraries are
disappearing as well—as of 2003, 85% of libraries in use during the Soviet era were no longer in
operation (Menzel 44-5). The government has structured policy around these changing
circumstances, as Rosalind March has noted:
Putin’s government considers the press and electronic media far more politically
influential than “high culture” which now appeals only to a minority audience and
appears to pose no threat to the President’s levels of support among the
population or to the regime’s ultimate survival. Putin is more interested in
encouraging certain aspects of Russian culture which enhance the Russian state,
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especially those which are most visible to foreign visitors, such as sculpture, the
visual arts and architecture, or which export well, such as opera, ballet, film and
television series based on classical literary texts, in order to revive Russian
national pride in the country’s great cultural traditions and to further his ambition
that Russia should again be perceived abroad as a “Great Power.” (34)
The 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi provided a glimpse into how Russia wishes to be
perceived by the rest of the world. The Opening Ceremony featured, among other things, a short
dramatized video of the history of Russia, beginning with the earliest inhabitants who engage in
hard physical labor such as chopping down trees and battling snowy winters in order to create
settlements (International Olympic Committee). A moment during the construction of St.
Petersburg is briefly shown, and then the focus shifts to the industrialization and modernization
of the late nineteenth century and into the Soviet era. The whole display is decidedly masculine,
revolving around hard labor and showcasing the toughness of the Russian people— only in the
final scene, the construction of the Fisht Olympic Stadium, is a woman featured in a position of
power, presumably as one of the engineers of the building. These themes are repeated to some
extent in the live show, which further explores more cultural elements—such as a War and
Peace-esque ballroom scene and a whitewashed representation of Soviet work culture. The
message of the Opening Ceremony is clear—Russia is, and continues to be, a great power.
Of particular interest is the alphabet sequence of the Opening Ceremony—the video
follows a Russian girl who falls asleep with an alphabet book on a dreamlike journey through the
Cyrillic alphabet, where each letter stands for a famous Russian or a cultural, scientific, or
technological achievement. Unsurprisingly, along with other writers such as Chekhov and
Dostoevsky, Tolstoy is included, though “T” is the only letter accompanied by two words—
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interestingly, Tolstoy shares the moment with “television” (IOC). This segment, though only a
small part of the Opening Ceremony, is notable in that it is the first segment and sends a clear
message of Russia’s accomplishments that is further substantiated by the subsequent displays.
Tolstoy is still used as a powerful symbol of the greatness of Russia and Russian culture,
and his legacy of inspiring patriotic fervor persists. In 2012, Tolstoy’s great-great-grandson,
Vladimir Tolstoy, became a cultural adviser to Putin, who “continues to strike notes of national
pride” by “enlisting the support of a member of an illustrious family” (Donadio, par. 3).
Vladimir Tolstoy, before his appointment, was actively involved in the Tolstoy museum at
Yasnaya Polyana, and though he adopts a more favorable attitude towards the West than
Vladimir Medinsky, Russia’s Minister of Culture, he still supports recent Russian actions in
Crimea, even using Tolstoy to justify his position:
“Leo Tolstoy was a Russian officer who defended Russia in the Fourth Bastion in
Sevastopol,” he said, speaking through a translator over tea in a cafe near the
museum. “For us, in our mind, [Crimea] has always been Russia.”
He was referring to the siege of Sevastopol in 1854-55 in the Crimean War, in
which Russia fought the allied forces of France, Britain, Sardinia and the Ottoman
Empire and ultimately lost control of the city. “Of course, as a descendant of the
Russian officer Leo Tolstoy, I cannot have any other attitude toward that,” he
added. (Donadio, par. 6-7)
Vladimir Tolstoy’s association of Tolstoy with his stint in the Crimean War is reminiscent of
WWII-era conceptions of Tolstoy as first and foremost a patriot and defender of the motherland.
Apparently, this idea has never completely disappeared, considering that Vladimir Tolstoy
privileges this nationalistic Tolstoy over the Tolstoy whose pacifism led him to become ashamed
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of his involvement in the Crimean War (Fodor 88). Vladimir Tolstoy’s attitude “reflects a
growing tendency since Mr. Putin’s re-election in 2012 to see Russia as somehow purer than the
West,” which does not appear to be abating (Donadio, par. 18).
Anna Karenina remains a relevant work in Russian culture, as evidenced by a popular
online “live reading” of the novel which took place over the course of 30 hours in October 2014
and set the world record for number of viewers watching an “online reading aloud marathon”
(Russia Beyond the Headlines, par. 1-4). The event was sponsored by both Google and the
Tolstoy museum at Yasnaya Polyana (par. 3). Participants included numerous famous Russians,
from actors and writers to government figures like Vladimir Medinsky and Deputy Prime
Minister Arkady Dvorkovich. The support and participation of high-ranking members of the
government suggest that they viewed the exercise as worthwhile, and the favorable response to
the live reading reflects the fact that Tolstoy remains important to Russian culture.
Russia is still in the process of forming its post-Soviet identity, providing fertile ground
for a resurgence of cultural nationalism. Just as the Soviet government molded Tolstoy and his
works to promote state ideology, so too may today’s Russia utilize Tolstoy for its own ends;
reviving the legacy of Tolstoy as a god-like symbol of Russian greatness would be appropriate as
Putin works to restore Russia to its former position of prestige and power. History suggests the
effectiveness of this strategy in the promotion of a state-sponsored ideology. Despite the marked
decline in reading among Russians over the past thirty years, Tolstoy remains, at the very least,
one of the most significant cultural figures in Russia. He speaks to a primal sense of
Russianness— as Fodor suggests, “[o]ne has to be a Russian to know that Tolstoy was much
more than just a writer, and an American to know that ‘Old Glory’ is more than just a piece of
cloth” (15). What Russians believe about Tolstoy is more significant than who Tolstoy actually
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was, and perception of Tolstoy and his works can be shaped, whether for good or ill, by those
with the power and motivation to do so.

Bauman 37
Works Cited
Aron, Leon. "Why Vladimir Putin Says Russia Is Exceptional." The Wall Street Journal. Dow
Jones & Company, Inc., 30 May 2014. Web. 12 Apr. 2015.
Bartlett, Rosamund. Tolstoy: A Russian Life. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011. Print.
Berdyaev, Nikolai. The Russian Idea. Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne, 1992. Print.
Dobrenko, Evgeny. "Literary Criticism and the Transformations of the Literary Field During the
Cultural Revolution, 1928-1932." A History of Russian Literary Theory and Criticism:
The Soviet Age and Beyond. Ed. Evgeny Dobrenko and Galin Tihanov. Pittsburgh, PA: U
of Pittsburgh, 2011. 43-63. Print.
Donadio, Rachel. "In Putin's Nationalist Russia, a Tolstoy as Cultural Diplomat." New York
Times 21 Mar. 2015, C1 sec.: n. pag. The New York Times. The New York Times
Company, 20 Mar. 2015. Web. 7 Apr. 2015.
Emerson, Caryl. "Literary Theory in the 1920s: Four Options and a Practicum." A History of
Russian Literary Theory and Criticism: The Soviet Age and Beyond. Ed. Evgeny
Dobrenko and Galin Tihanov. Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh, 2011. 64-89. Print.
Fodor, Alexander. Tolstoy and the Russians: Reflections on a Relationship. Ann Arbor, MI:
Ardis, 1984. Print.
Hough, Jerry F. "The Cultural Revolution and Western Understanding of the Soviet
System." Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931. Ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick. Bloomington:
Indiana UP, 1978. 241-53. Print.
International Olympic Committee. “The Complete Sochi 2014 Opening Ceremony | Sochi 2014
Winter Olympics.” Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 16 May 2014. Web. 7 Apr.
2015.

Bauman 38
Kaufman, Andrew. "Levin: ‘To Err and to Dream.’" Understanding Tolstoy. Columbus: Ohio
State UP, 2011. 148-73. Print.
Kramer, Karl D. "Some Impressions of Soviet Literary Scholarship." Russian Review 23.4
(1964): 370-76. JSTOR. Web. 6 Oct. 2014.
Kornienko, Natalia. "Literary Criticism and Cultural Policy during the New Economic Policy,
1921–1927." A History of Russian Literary Theory and Criticism: The Soviet Age and
Beyond. Ed. Evgeny Dobrenko and Galin Tihanov. Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh, 2011.
17-42. Print.
Lapidus, Gail Warshofsky. "Educational Strategies and Cultural Revolution: The Politics of
Soviet Development." Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931. Ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick.
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1978. 78-104. Print.
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. “Leo Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution.” Lenin Collected
Works. Vol. 15. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973. N. pag. Marxists Internet Archive.
Web. 25 Sept. 2014.
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. “L.N. Tolstoy.” Lenin Collected Works. Vol. 16. Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1974. N. pag. Marxists Internet Archive. Web. 25 Sept. 2014.
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. “L.N. Tolstoy and the Modern Labour Movement.” Lenin Collected
Works. Vol. 16. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967. N. pag. Marxists Internet Archive.
Web. 25 Sept. 2014.
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. “Party Organisation and Party Literature.” Lenin Collected Works. Vol.
10. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965. N. pag. Marxists Internet Archive. Web. 6 Oct.
2014.

Bauman 39
Lisovskaya, Elena, and Vyacheslav Karpov. "New Ideologies in Postcommunist Russian
Textbooks." Comparative Education Review 43.4 (1999): 522-43. JSTOR. Web. 25 Nov.
2014.
Lovell, Stephen. The Russian Reading Revolution: Print Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet
Eras. New York: St. Martin's, 2000. Print.
Lieven, Dominic. "Russian, Imperial and Soviet Identities." Transactions of the Royal Historical
Society 6th ser. 8 (1998): 253-69. JSTOR. Web. 6 Oct. 2014.
Marsh, Rosalind J. Literature, History and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia, 1991-2006. Oxford:
Peter Lang, 2007. Print.
Menzel, Birgit. "Writing, Reading and Selling Literature in Russia 1986-2004."Reading for
Entertainment in Contemporary Russia: Post-Soviet Popular Literature in Historical
Perspective. Ed. Stephen Lovell and Birgit Menzel. München, Germany: Kubon &
Sagner, 2005. 39-56. Print.
Menzel, Birgit, and Boris Dubin. "Literary Criticism and the End of the Soviet System, 19851991." A History of Russian Literary Theory and Criticism: The Soviet Age and beyond.
Ed. Evgeny Dobrenko and Galin Tihanov. Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh, 2011. 250-68.
Print.
Orwin, Donna Tussing. Tolstoy's Art and Thought, 1847-1880. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP,
1993. Print.
Parthé, Kathleen. Russia's Dangerous Texts: Politics between the Lines. New Haven: Yale UP,
2004. Print.
Russia Beyond the Headlines. "Google Launches Site Featuring Online Readings of Tolstoy's
'Anna Karenina'" Russia Beyond the Headlines 18 Feb. 2015: n. pag. Print.

Bauman 40
Sakwa, Richard. "Political Leadership." Return to Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future
Uncertain. Ed. Stephen K. Wegren. 5th ed. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. 2543. Print.
Shneidman, N. N. "The Russian Classical Literary Heritage and the Basic Concepts of Soviet
Literary Education." Slavic Review 31.3 (1972): 626-38. JSTOR. Web. 6 Oct. 2014.
Shneidman, N. N. "Soviet Approaches to the Teaching of Literature: A Case Study: L. Tolstoy in
Soviet Education." Canadian Slavonic Papers 15.3 (1973): 325-50. Print.
Stacy, R. H. Russian Literary Criticism, a Short History. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse UP, 1974.
Print.
Struve, Gleb. "Tolstoy in Soviet Criticism." Russian Review 19.2 (1960): 171-86. JSTOR. Web.
6 Oct. 2014.
Tolstoy, Leo. Anna Karenina: A Novel in Eight Parts. Trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa
Volokhonsky. New York, NY: Penguin, 2002. Print.
Wellek, René. "Russian Formalism." Russian Modernism: Culture and the Avant-garde, 19001930. Ed. George Gibian and H. W. Tjalsma. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1976. 31-48. Print.
Wilson, A. N. Tolstoy. New York: Norton, 1988. Print.

